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Abstract
Blockchains have recently gained popularity thanks to their ability to record ’´digital truth´’. They are
designed to keep persistence, security, and avoid attacks which is useful for many applications. However,
they are still problematic in their energy consumption, governance, and scalability Current solutions either
require vast computing power via Proof-of-Work (PoW) or cannot directly utilize computing power as a
resource in virtual mining.
Here, we propose incentive-based protocols that use competitions to integrate computing power into
blockchains. We introduce Proof-of-Accumulated-Work (PoAW): miners compete in costumer-submitted
jobs, accumulate recorded work whenever they are successful, and, over time, are remunerated. The
underlying competition replaces the standard hash puzzle-based competitions of PoW. A competition is
managed by a dynamically-created small masternode network (dTMN) of invested miners. dTMNs allow
for scalability as we do not need the entire network to manage the competition. Using careful design on
incentives, our system preserves security, avoids attacks, and offers new markets to miners. When there
are no costumers the system converges into a standard protocol.
Our proposed solution improves the way by which the blockchain infrastructure works and makes use
of its computing power. We also discuss how the protocol can be used by fields that require solving difficult
optimization problems, such as Artificial Intelligence and Pattern Recognition in Big Data.
Keywords. Blockchain, computing, algorithms, useful work, artificial intelligence, competitions.
1 Introduction
In this section we provide a thorough review about
blockchains and the difficulty in utilizing their com-
puting power. Readers familiar with basic termi-
nology can skip this section.
1.1 General Background
Bitcoin, presented first in 2008, was the first func-
tional decentralized digital cash system to achieve
international popularity [1]. It is based on an infras-
tructure called blockchain: an immutable ledger of
transactions made among public keys of users. As
a result, Bitcoin and other blockchain based cash
systems are also called cryptocurrencies. In recent
years, cryptocurrencies and blockchains have gained
popularity but were also criticized for being used in
a speculative nature, and for lacking substance [2].
Nevertheless, the interest in the blockchain technol-
ogy itself is high as it can be utilized for decentral-
ized self-governing protocols. The applicability of
such systems is being investigated in other domains
such as smart contracts, credit systems, artificial
intelligence, and others [3].
A blockchain is a persistent decentralized ledger
of transactions. Persistence, in this context, means
that: (1) there is an underlying data structure that
keeps an ordered collection of records, typically
∗For comments, questions, and suggestions please contact ddam.am AT gmail.com
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
03
37
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 J
an
 20
19
transactions, and (2) past transactions cannot be
modified (i.e., immutability). Thus, this data struc-
ture essentially represents a recorded digital truth
[4]. The term blockchain is used because the data
are kept in a linked list of blocks of information
that can be extended only by adding a new single
block as the head of the chain. Decentralization
in our context means that there is no single entity
that keeps the information and to which all trust
is given. Alternatively, there is a network of peers
that each holds a copy of the data. This is accom-
panied with a protocol that lists rules on how a new
block is added.
Blockchains can be public or kept within an or-
ganization. Regardless of the paradigm, they still
have a network of peers, also called miners, and pos-
sible users. To keep the properties above, data must
be accessible to all network members and users.
Users can get multiple copies of the ledger and use
the protocol to decide which one is correct. The
accepted majority version is called the consensus.
In addition, blocks are added in a controlled rate
to guarantee that there is enough time for the net-
work to reach a consensus when the data structure
changes.
Miners both keep a copy of the blockchain and
can propose new blocks. They have a clear incen-
tive to have their newly proposed blocks accepted
to become a part the blockchain (i.e., in the copy of
every other miner): they are entitled for a payment.
As a result, miners compete for the right to add new
blocks. This competition seems to be in contradic-
tion to the need to regulate the block addition rate,
which is essential to keep decentralization. This gap
is solved by introducing the concept of proofs: for
the network to consider a new block, the miner must
prove to all other peers that a certain resource was
spent in the process. Using proofs achieves another
important goal. Since the miners compete amongst
themselves, the proof system makes it expensive to
achieve exclusive ownership on block addition. This
property keeps the integrity of the data by estab-
lishing trust among the miners.
Public blockchains must be resistant to attacks
in which an adversary tries to tamper with the data
by either introducing false transactions or falsifying
past data, which can be used to carry double spend-
ing. One source of susceptibility for such attacks are
cases in which there is a miner that holds 51% or
more of the resources on which proofs rely. If such a
situation is used for falsifying data it is called a 51%
attack. However, note that even if such an attack
succeeds it will be easily visible by the users and
other miners because the data are public. Thus, if
there is a large set of honest miners that abide to
the protocol, they will reject the false blocks and
the network will split into two versions. A split is
both visible and is likely to reduce the value of the
entire system, including for the adversary.
Popular blockchain systems today are based on
Proof-of-Work (PoW): proofs that guarantee that a
certain amount of computing work was performed.
This is done using a well-known cryptographic tool
called hash-based computational puzzles, for more
details see Section 1.3. PoW protocols are de-
signed such that the expected number of blocks that
miners sign is proportional to their relative weight
compared to the total computing power of the net-
work. As a result, 51% attacks are achievable only
by a miner whose total computing power is larger
than 50% of the combined power of the network.
An alternative to PoW is called virtual mining on
which we focus below.
1.2 Virtual Mining
The basic idea of virtual mining is that money itself
can be treated as a form of PoW. In other words,
the act of acquiring coins proves that peers had in-
vested from their own resources to become a part
of the system. Therefore, we can use money, either
owned or deposited, as the underlying proof system
of the blockchain. Moreover, deposited amounts
can be used as collateral, thereby promoting trust.
Such systems are often called Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
systems, but other related names such as Proof-of-
Deposit (PoD) are also used. Naturally, as in PoW,
the system will give the right to sign blocks in a
way that is proportional to the amount of stakes
each miner presents. As a result, PoS has a se-
curity advantages: it reduces 51% attacks. Such
attackers need to get coins first at large amounts.
This both require substantial funds in other coin
(crypto or not) and raises the value of the coin. To-
gether it makes it less likely that such attacker will
gain from attacking the system.
It is important to note that virtual mining has
some issues that are still under research. The most
famous example is multiforging that results from
Nothing-at-Stake (N@S): miners in PoS have noth-
ing to lose by approving different histories [5]. PoW
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avoids that by having the solved puzzles dependent
on the information of the suggested block. More-
over, it is expensive and not advantageous to work
in different chains. In contrast, in PoS we cannot
force miners to converge into a single chain because
miners do not lose anything by multi-branching. On
the other hand, virtual mining involves stacking a
large amount of coins over time to achieve reason-
able weight in the system. Thus, such miners both
lose the liquidity of their resources and are highly
invested in the success of the network. This some-
what contradicts N@S in that a network with mul-
tiple simulated chains will potentially get bad pub-
licity and lose some of its value. We list below some
extant virtual mining solutions.
Peercoin (PPCoin) by King and Nadal, 2012 [6]
is a PoW-PoS hybrid system. There are two block
types: PoW-based and PoS-based. PoS blocks have
a special transaction in which the signer pays him-
self (thereby nullifying the age of his coins). This
transaction is called coinstake and its first input is
called the kernel. The kernel is a solution to an
easy hash puzzle. The hash puzzle difficulty in the
kernels is inversely proportional to the amount of
stakes that the miner burns. The difficulty for-
mula was designed to give preference to stakes over
pure hash solutions. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that utilizing coin-age within the proto-
col means that unlike other PoS systems coins can
be staked once, which makes the system more de-
centralized. On the other hand, this system has a
centralized mechanism called checkpoints in which
a group of trusted miners time-stamp a version of
the blockchain. This idea was taken from one of the
earliest modifications to Bitcoin, and is used to pre-
vent N@S issues. As a side note, this implies that
Bitcoin and Peercoin are not fully decentralized sys-
tems.
DASH by Duffield and Diaz [7] is a method that
was designed as a PoW system that overcomes some
of the main problems in Bitcoin including: scalabil-
ity, privacy issues, and the decrease in the number
of service providing nodes. The method introduced
the notion of a secondary network of masternodes:
full nodes that have incentives to provide services
to users and not only deal with mining. To become
a masternode the miner has to store 1000 DASH
coins. In return to providing special services to the
network masternodes are paid roughly 45% of the
total block reward. Thus, the masternodes act as
a quorum of trusted nodes that can perform spe-
cial transactions such as mixing, which is a tech-
nique that allows anonymizing client’s history, and
instant sending of funds. DASH is an elegant PoW
and Proof-of-Service (PoSe) combination that pro-
motes decentralization in a secured way. However,
the idea of PoSe-based secondary master network is
a general idea that can be exploited for other tasks.
Hybrid methods: Decred [8] this system was
proposed by the developers of btcsuite. This is a
PoW/PoS hybrid system that aims to solve N@S
by having PoS miners acting as a second authenti-
cation mechanism for new blocks. Thus, PoS can-
not be used for creating multiple chains because it
only approves past blocks. Decred also strengthen
governance because the external PoS miners act as
another layer that votes on the integrity of the data.
Ethereum’s Casper this is a complex proto-
col that has not been materialized at this point
but shares some conceptual similarity with Decred.
Ethereum [9] set a goal is to implement a PoS
system that will be integrated and finally replace
PoW. The proposed PoS has two features that make
Casper different from other suggestions. First, un-
like Peercoin, to become a miner there is a mini-
mal sum that must be staked. Second, the network
punishes an attacker by consuming the coins of his
stakes. Thus, unlike the other PoS alternatives it di-
rectly reduces the incentives of an attacker. More-
over since creation of multiple chains is easily de-
tectable, the network can easily punish miners that
attempt such attacks.
1.3 Hash puzzles
PoW uses computational puzzles that are based on
hash functions, which makes them practically use-
less for other applications (other than those used in
cryptography and blockchains).
Definition 1.1 A hash function H maps input
strings to output strings and have the following five
properties [10]:
1. Any input, fixed output : H takes an input of
any size and outputs a string of a fixed size n.
That is, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
2. Collision resistance: it is computationally in-
feasible to find two inputs x and y such that
x 6= y and H(x) = H(y).
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3. Hiding : It is infeasible to learn what x is from
knowing H(r||x) where || denotes concatena-
tion and r is a randomly selected value from a
distribution F whose minimal entropy is high.
4. Puzzle friendliness: there is no algorithm with
an average case complexity better than o(2n)
to find x given H(k||x), where k is a randomly
selected value from a distribution F whose
minimal entropy is high.
5. Cheap validation: for any input x of size m,
H(x) is computable in O(m).
Hash puzzles are only good for showing that the
miner performed many computations and cannot be
used for practical computational tasks. This major
drawback can prevent using PoW in very large sys-
tems as the energy consumption can be too large.
On the other hand, the combined computational
power that results from such networks is a valuable
resource that can be utilized as another resource on
which the blockchain is built.
1.4 Useful work challenges
One inevitable question is why is it not straightfor-
ward to utilize the blockchain network for solving
real computational problems? This question de-
pends on the underlying blockchain context. For
PoW, can hash puzzles be replaced with useful com-
putational work? For PoS, can we implement an
efficient contract-based system?
First, useful computational work is not puzzle
friendly nor easy to track. Puzzle friendliness, on
the other hand, requires having a tight lower bound
on the running time for each puzzle instance. This
is a very strong constraint that is not expected to
be satisfied in an arbitrary computational problem.
Even if we have theoretical results for a specific
problem type, it usually does not guarantee that the
theoretical complexity will be realized in each in-
stance. Moreover, when solving optimization prob-
lems we often do not know if a given solution is the
best one (or close enough to the best one). For ex-
ample, for NP-Complete (NPC) problems, we may
be able to validate that a given solution is correct
but we do not know that it is necessarily the best
one. More formally, for a NPC problem M with
a polynomial validation algorithm FM (s) that effi-
ciently computes the score of a candidate solution
s, we can only validate FM (s) = x, where x ∈ 0, 1
for a decision problem, and a score for an optimiza-
tion problem. However, we often cannot claim that
there is no other solution with a better score, un-
less NP=coNP. Non-convex optimization problems
have a similar problem: we may know that we had
reached a local optimum, but we often do not know
if it is a global optimum or not. Another issue
is that for many applications the underlying prob-
lems depend on high volume data, which is out of
the scope of the block sizes of almost all current
blockchains. Thus, a complete solution must utilize
a storage component.
Second, a simple contract-based system will
not directly utilized the incoming resources to
strengthen the blockchain, nor will it exploit more
than a single market for the miners. While imple-
menting a computing resource or a hardware leasing
application on top of a blockchain seems practical,
a miner that provides hardware acts as a contractor
and has no responsibilities nor incentives to main-
tain the network. Naturally, an integrated system
in which miners are paid both for useful work and
for being peers in the network will be more attrac-
tive.
Third, hybrid systems and systems that aim to
deviate hash energy to contact-based useful work
are directly open to a precarious vulnerability to
adaptive 51% attacks: powerful miners can moni-
tor the hash difficulty and wait for time points in
which it is feasible for them to carry a 51% attack.
This sensitivity stems from inflated variance in hash
puzzle difficulty due to oscillations in the percent-
age of energy devoted to puzzles. This point may
seem subtle. However, it creates a major problem
for contract-based methods as they may seem to
take the blockchain infrastructure for granted and
in the same time open it to attacks. Moreover, this
problem may also affect PoS systems that are based
on pricing the stakes. As we shall explain below, we
solve this issue by introducing a new system based
on accumulating useful work.
Fourth, a protocol that rewards computational
problem solvers with preference for signing blocks
is exposed to new attacks:
Definition 1.2 An O(1) attack of a protocol P is
enabled if P either allows or enables a state with a
positive incentive for an adversary to: (1) post prob-
lems for which he knows the optimal answer, and (2)
immediately propose solutions to these problems.
In such cases we say that P is O(1)-sensitive. The
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adversary’s positive incentive can be direct (e.g., P
pays for solving tasks) or indirect such as by gaining
preference in adding new blocks.
Definition 1.3 A suboptimal solution adversary
(SSA) for a problem M in a protocol P is a miner
that knowingly posts suboptimal or intermediary
solutions for M . The protocol P is SSA-enabling if
there is no negative result for posting such solutions.
Finally, hash functions cannot be simply re-
placed with other functions that are useful for real-
world applications without tampering security. In-
tuitively, real-world applications are based on func-
tions that preserve information: similar inputs are
likely to result in similar answers, and the output
usually gives some information about the output.
Thus, as a general rule of thumb, useful functions
unlike hash functions are not collision resistant nor
hiding. For an example from distances in graphs,
see the Appendix.
1.5 Extant systems
Previous work addressed useful work mainly by try-
ing to replace hash functions with other computa-
tions. For example, Oliver et al., 2017 [11] pro-
posed solving NP complete problems (NPC). Note,
however, that much like the graph distance problem
above, such problems do not satisfy collision resis-
tance and hiding, and only partially satisfy puzzle
friendliness and cheap validation. For validation the
problem is that while NPC solutions can be vali-
dated to be true once cannot guarantee that a neg-
ative proposition (i.e., there are no cliques of size
k in the graph G) unless NP=coNP. As a result,
Oliver et al., 2017 [11] proposed that a new block
can be signed with a solution to a problem P only
if the solution improves upon past solutions. Sur-
prisingly, using the O(1) and SSA described above
the blockchain system of [11] can be easily dam-
aged such that: (1) the block addition rate cannot
be regulated, and (2) an adversary can take over
many blocks without performing computations.
Another problem of the approach above is that
difficulty of instances of NPC problems is hard to
determine in advance (even though rough bounds
can be computed), and thus even without attacks
the control of block addition may be jeopardized.
Several previous papers have presented ways to pre-
serve hash properties by substantially limiting the
set of practical problems that can be solved. Ball
and colleagues [12] presented a proof system based
on solving the orthogonal vectors problem, whereas
[13] proposed primecoin: a system based on looking
for Cunningham numbers.
2 Our new PoAW protocol
2.1 Outline
We start by introducing the idea of Proof-of-
Accumulated-Work (PoAW): a system that accu-
mulates past useful work in a way that is se-
cure thanks to protocol-enforced constraints and re-
wards. Second, we introduce dynamic Task Mas-
ternode Networks (dTMNs): dynamically created
subnetworks of invested miners that manage user-
submitted tasks.
To achieve our goals we integrate our new con-
cepts with: (1) virtual mining, (2) replacing com-
petitions for solving hashes with competitions over
computational tasks, and (3) storage blockchains.
Virtual mining (with or without using hybrid PoW
within) is used to keep the main blockchain and acts
as the glue between the different concepts. Pub-
lic competitions are the places in which computa-
tional miners can do useful work and reach an addi-
tional market other than the financial system of the
blockchain itself. The storage chain keeps the infor-
mation about the computational tasks: the input
data and the solutions submitted by the competing
nodes throughout each competition. Miners of the
distributed storage can constitute the dTMN, which
also validates suggested solutions and get rewards.
We also avoid the need to precisely evaluate the
difficulty of the users’ computational tasks. Alter-
natively, we let users offer the tasks to the system
and their payment. Thus, we let the market regu-
late the value of each optimization problem that is
submitted.
The resulting protocol achieves three important
goals. First, the network keeps the cryptographic
power of the blockchain components intact. Second,
most of the computational power of the system can
be utilized to solve optimization problems. Finally,
miners earn from both serving the blockchain and
solving computational tasks. Moreover, we prove
that joining our network as a computational node
is more profitable than either renting hardware in a
contract-based system or standard PoW mining.
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2.2 The virtual mining system
2.2.1 Virtual stakes
We use virtual mining to obtain two goals. First,
as in standard virtual mining, miners can use their
stakes to sign or approve new blocks, which has ben-
eficial results for a decentralization and governance
[8]. Second, it acts as a device for implementing
PoAW within the protocol. Miners that solve com-
putational tasks get virtual stakes (vstakes) once a
competition is sealed. Thus, when a computational
task is sealed, there is a special transaction that cre-
ates a certain amount of locked virtual money that
the miner can use as stakes only. These are not coins
that the user can send or spend: these are rather
specialized tokens that the miner gets from the sys-
tem in return for solving tasks. These amounts can
be accumulated, which means that by solving com-
putational tasks miners transform their useful work
into system-approved certificates.
Vstakes are a general way to accumulate work.
They provide a way to later remunerate miners for
their work, which already earned from solving fees.
Moreover, they can be utilized within any PoS or
hybrid PoW/PoS system as long as it allows record-
ing and burning virtual stakes. Specifically, in our
current system we propose using virtual stakes to
approving blocks within the PoS system of Decred
(see Figure 1 for illustration).
2.2.2 Decred augmentation
Decred [8], which shares conceptual similarities to
both DASH [7] and Peercoin [6], is based on a lot-
tery system in which tickets are purchased and then
deposited for a wait period before they can be spent.
Selection of tickets from a pool is done using a pseu-
dorandom algorithm that is based on information in
the head of the new block. This allows (pseudo) ran-
dom selection of tickets from the pool. Each ticket
gives the PoS miner a single vote, but ticket prices
are determined by the protocol automatically such
that the total number of tickets is maintained at a
desired limit. This process is the Decred PoS equiv-
alent of a standard hash difficulty determination al-
gorithm. For a new block to be accepted into the
blockchain five votes must approve it. The PoS min-
ers receive both their tickets worth and additional
payment. Note that there is an approximately 5%
chance that a ticket will end up deleted without
producing additional reward.
A tickets lifetime goes through the following
stages. It is created when a miner pays the ticket
price + ticket fee. A block can create up to 20 new
tickets. Tickets are mined into a block such that
those with higher fees get preference. Once accepted
into the blockchain, a ticket must wait 256 blocks
before it enters into the ticket pool. The ticket pool
size is kept at 40960. If a ticket is not selected after
142 days it expires and the miner is paid back the
ticket price. After a ticket is consumed, it enters
into another 256 blocks period of wait after which
its associated funds are released.
Voting is done by transforming tickets into vote
transactions. A vote represents the ticket valida-
tion of the last seen block. The new block must
contain a majority of the votes to be added into
the blockchain (which implies that votes can be
missed). Only when the previous block is validated
by the votes in the new block the blocks funds in
the UTXO set (set of remnants funds and rewards
to the miner) are allowed. The process presents the
validation result of the last block in a single bit that
summarizes the result. Also, note that PoS miners
must remain constantly active as they may other-
wise miss their voting turn. This property of Decred
will be discussed again in the next section.
Decred is similar in spirit to DASH in that they
both establish a masternode network that takes over
a desired task. In both, becoming a member of this
network costs either in tickets in Decred or in de-
positing 1000 coins in DASH. Note that DASH is
not a PoS system per se in that there is a single
deposit and amounts are not staked. Nevertheless,
the idea of substantial initial deposit can be eas-
ily extended into the Decred protocol. Also, note
that the main goal of Decred is to strengthen de-
centralization and open governance while promot-
ing community input. These needs stem from past
weaknesses observed in Botcoin and past criticism
of the PoS idea. On the other hand, Decred was
not developed to deal with the energy consumption
problem and the non-usefulness of PoW.
In our augmentation of Decred vstakes are given
to the winners of a computational competition at
its last transaction, called SealCT . Let feesolve be
the amount that the client wishes to pay for a task
CT (a formal definition of a task and its associated
transactions will be give below). We define a proto-
col parameter called Pvstake. The SealCT transac-
tion contains a special minting command that gives
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Figure 1: Computational miner Bob wins a competition for a task and gets virtual stakes. To later sign a
new block Bob can burn previously earned virtual stakes, used locked real money stakes (as in the standard
PoS protocol), or present hash puzzle solutions.
the following amount of vstakes to each winner:
(Pvstake ∗ feesolve)
NW
where NW is the number of miners that won the
competition.
2.2.3 The PoS higher profit invariant
Virtual stakes can be used only for purchasing tick-
ets. Moreover, we define another constraint that
is essential for preventing O(1) attacks. Let x be
the amount in coins of virtual stakes that are used
to purchase a ticket. Our PoS higher profit invari-
ant (simply called PoS invariant) determines that x
cannot yield extra profit from the system.
Formally, let y > x be the price of a ticket and
let r > 1 is the expected profit factor of the PoS
mining. For example, in a system that is designed
to produce an expected 10% profit on PoS spent
money r = 1.1. In our system only y− x is entitled
to receive r where x is entitled to exactly 1. That
is, the PoS miner will receive from the system an
expected reward of x + r(y − x). Another way to
interpret this constraint is that PoW miners are not
asked by the protocol to share their profits with the
PoS rights that result from virtual stakes.
In our protocol each new block also mints new
coins. Note that these new coins are not entitled
to virtual stakes. Thus, PoW miners are paid once
for their work. However, they do not get all minted
coins as in Decred, some of these sums go to the
PoS miners as a reward.
2.2.4 The robustness of the system
By accumulating useful work within virtual mining
we obtain a way to ensure the strength of the system
even if a hybrid PoS/PoW like Decred is used. The
accumulation and scoring of past work using vstakes
means that adversaries that try to reach consider-
able resource weight now compete with both miners
that solve hash puzzles, miners that solve computa-
tional tasks, and miners that do pure PoS mining.
Moreover, the integration with Decred means that
getting double spending approved requires reaching
51% of the combination of all three resources above.
First, our competition system explained in the
next section prevents O(1) attacks and reduces the
incentive to submit suboptimal solutions. Second,
note that our system further avoids N@S (i.e., on
top of the specific system that is used, e.g., DASH or
Decred) by directly mixing stakes with useful work
vstakes that are used for proof of burn: miners can
spend their hard earned vstakes once and then they
are deleted. This is equivalent to paying in actual
cash for the right to sign blocks. Thus, miners are
not likely to spend their vstakes in different chains
as some may be lost from the consensus.
2.3 Computational competitions
2.3.1 Preliminaries and notations
Tasks. A computational task CT =<
Type, FD, D,C, S >, is a five-tuple where Type
is a bit specifying if this is a maximization or a
minimization problem, FD is the scoring function
we wish to optimize that depends on a dataset
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D, which can be null if FD is self-contained. C
is a set of constraints, and S is a set of ad-
ditional search space parameters on top of the
ones implied by the definition of FD. For each
computational task CT we define its slim version
CT s =< Type, FD, H(D), C, S > which is exactly
as CT except for the data element: we keep the
hash result of the data instead of D itself. Thus,
CT s requires much less space as compared to CT .
Example 2.1 An instance of an Integer Linear Pro-
gramming (ILP) problem has a linear optimization
function we wish to maximize F = cTx, D = ∅. C
is specified using the following constraints:
Ax ≤ b
x ∈ Zn
ILP is NPC even if x ∈ {0, 1}n. A generalized ver-
sion of ILP that allows both discrete and continuous
variables is called Mixed Integer Linear Program-
ming (MILP).
Example 2.2 (GD) Let G be a continuous and
differentiable function in Rn. Gradient descent
(GD) algorithms define an optimization problem
for minimizing G that is based on computing the
steepest descent. Let ∇G be the gradient function
of G. Given a point x ∈ Rn in the search space we
update it by computing: x′ = x − ∇G(x) where
 is the learning rate of the algorithm. The al-
gorithm converges to a local minimum when the
difference between x and x′ is negligible. A sim-
ple way to reformulate the problem using our no-
tation is to let miners search for local optimum
points defined as points in which x′−x ≤ ∗, which
means ∇G(x) ≥ ∗. Thus, we wish to maximize
F (x) = ∇G(x). We can further define in S the al-
lowed approximation accuracy on x, e.g., do not use
resolution greater than 10−3. Of course, this formu-
lation, while being legal, distorts the original goal
of minimizing G. Clearly we can have F (x) = G(x)
and let miners choose their own algorithm, but the
goal of this example was to illustrate the applica-
bility for GD instances.
Transactions. We define a set of competition-
related transactions. PublishCT is a bid offer by
the client to the storage. StoredCT is a transaction
that marks the acceptance of CT and its associated
dataset into the storage. It also marks the accep-
tance of CT into the system as a new competition.
SolveCT is a transaction that contains an offered
solution. V alidateCT is a transaction in which the
dynamic Task Masternode Network (dTMN), which
is a group of storage peers that govern data storage
and validation, is asked to validate and choose the
winner, which is finally marked using a transaction
called SealCT .
As common in blockchains, the transactions
above may offer some fees to promote their exe-
cution or addition to the ledger. Generally, our
transactions have two mechanisms by which service
fees are paid. First, we have regular fees that are
sums that party A sends directly to party B. These
are generally denoted as Feetr. Second, we have
promised fees (PFs), which are sums paid later than
the block if a certain criteria was met.
Formally, a promised fee PF =< o, p, b > is
a contract stating that if a payment o is carried
then a certain fraction p ∈ [0, 1] is sent after at
least b blocks. Formally, all competition related
transactions are tuples and each transaction has a
unique identifier which can be denoted as ID(Tr)
of a transaction Tr (of any type). We define several
transactions below. For ease of notation we omit
the transaction ID and its Feetr.
• The first transaction is called PublishCT
and it gives all the needed informa-
tion from the client. PublishCT =<
CT s, F eesub, Feesolve, PFsolve, PubIDc >,
where CT s is the slim version of CT , Feesub >
0 is a storage submission fee. Feesolve is the
total offered solving fee, PFsolve is a a data
structure that details the promised fees taken
from Feesolve as reward to the infrastructure
maintaining miners. Note that PFsolve speci-
fies amounts that are paid only if the compe-
tition successfully outputs a result.This issue
is further discussed in Section 3.
• StoredCT =< CT s, IDpublish, PubIDc,
PubIDmasternode >, where CT
s is the slim
version of CT , IDpublish is the ID of the
PublishCT transaction previously submitted
by the client. PubIDmasternode is a set of stor-
age miners (i.e., their public keys) that are
committed to store the data of CT , such that
|PubIDmasternode| > rs, where rs is a proto-
col parameter added to ensure that there are
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enough copies of CT in storage.
• SolveCT =< PubIDminer, Sig(Sol), Score,
PubIDCT , IDstorage >, where PubIDminer
is the public key of the submitting miner,
Sig(Sol) is a digital signature of the submit-
ted solution that acts as a commitment of the
miner that his real solution will have the score
Score. PubIDCT is the identifier of the as-
sociated PublishCT transaction. IDstorage is
the public id of the storage miner from which
data were retrieved.
• V alidateCT =< EdTMN > is a transaction in
which each member of the dTMN of CT adds
an encrypted list of past SolveCT transactions
that were successfully validated.
• SealCT =< DdTMN > contains the de-
cryption specification for interpreting the
V alidateCT transaction. By knowing this in-
formation the winner of the competition is de-
clared.
Competition parameters. Let BC = B1, B2, be
the ordered set of blocks in the blockchain. De-
note BC(i,j) = Bi, , Bj to be a subset of BC start-
ing at block i and ending in block j. A computa-
tional competition CCCT is associated with a sin-
gle computational task CT and has five phases: (0)
store, (1) freeze, (2) compete, (3) validate, and (4)
seal. Each phase has a defined number of blocks
that mark its duration. We denote this number as
NBx, where x is one of the competition phases. Let
I(Tr) be the block index of a transaction Tr in the
blockchain BC.
2.3.2 Competition flow
A computational competition acts as a microenvi-
ronment in our system and is illustrated in Figure
2. It lives as a set of related transactions on top
of the blockchain. A competition over a task CT
starts when StoredCT is added to the blockchain.
This is defined as a part of the protocol and ev-
ery user or a miner that observes the addition of
StoredCT to the block Bj = I(StoredCT ) can now
compute the duration of each phase of the compe-
tition.
Addition of StoredCT to the blockchain requires
a pre-competition process that establishes replicates
of data in storage and is fully described in Section
2.4. Briefly, this process starts when the client sub-
mits D and its accompanying information to the
storage chain in a transaction called PublishCT . Af-
ter a certain amount of time D has a required set
of copies in the storage chain, one copy per miner.
This set of miners becomes the dTMN: a subnet-
work of peers that are tasked with keeping D and
later validating proposed solutions. Throughout the
competition, the activity of the dTMN is similar to
a DASH maternode network. The peers continu-
ously send out ping messages notifying the network
that they are active. After validation has ended,
which is through a consensus reached by the dTMN,
they share a certain percentage of the fees that CT
entails.
The next phase is freeze: from block
I(PublishCT ) to block I(PublishCT )+NBfreeze no
SolveCT transaction is allowed into the blockchain.
This step is one of our tools against an O(1) at-
tack. In this case, the attacker has no guarantee
that her predefined solutions will be immediately
profitable. Moreover, other miners will now have
time to solve the published task. Next, the com-
pete phase is the main place in which the blockchain
stores proposed solutions for CT . For ensuring secu-
rity of their solutions the solving miners do not send
out their solution. Instead they present a digitally
signed commitment. The reason for this commit-
ment is to avoid a case in which the block signing
miners will present the observed solutions as their
own.
An important point in our protocol is that all
PF fees are accumulated across sealed competitions,
each in its designated pool, and are distributed ev-
ery Bdistr blocks. We maintain three profit pools
that are designed to reward the infrastructure com-
ponents of the competitions: (1) the main chain
(i.e., the public ledger), (2) the storage, and (3) the
storage-main chain interaction. Note that the last
pool is a derivative of pool (2): it is a defined per-
centage PSMPool of sums that the storage pool pays
the PoW miners for accepting the storage infras-
tructure transactions into the ledger (e.g., bid, ask,
or deal).
For every pool, funds are distributed in a way
that is proportional to the amount of work that was
done by the miners, which can also be weighted by
the transaction importance. For the main chain this
is kept in expected value (i.e., on average over a
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Figure 2: Illustration of the competition. Storage dTMN publishes the task to the network. After a freeze
phase solving miners (gray) send out their solutions. In the validation phase the dTMN gets the solutions
from the digital commitments given in the competition phase. In this case, the third proposed solution
is marked as irrelevant (shown in red) in the validation transaction due to failure to fulfill the commit-
ment. The asterisks marks that the validation phase may take a few blocks for the dTMN for reaching a
consensus. Finally, a sealing transaction is added and profits are distributed.
stochastic process), whereas the other pools give
out rewards in a deterministic fashion that is di-
rectly proportional to the amount of work done.
For simplicity, we next discuss the algorithm of the
main chain pool, which is based on enumerating the
SolveCT transactions from the winning miners. The
algorithms of the other pools are very similar but
they are based on enumerating all relevant trans-
actions in the ledger and not only those that are
related to the winner of the competition.
Let PF be the total sums in the main chain
pool from the promised fees of the sealed compe-
titions during the block range Bi, , Bj such that
j − i + 1 = Bdist. We assign a weight wk for each
block Bk such that:
j∑
k=i
wk = 1
. The weight wk is set to be proportional to the
number of SolveCT transactions in Bk that won
their competition. The weight allocation algorithm
is given below. For a block Bk with a weight wk
let S1, , Su be the set of StoreCT transactions in
Bk that won their competition and let M(Bk) be
the miner that signed Bk. Given the output of the
algorithm below, wk PF is given to M(Bk).
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Algorithm: MainChainWeightAllocation
Data: BC(i,j) am ordered subset of the blockchain
Result: blockProfits with the weighted profit per block
1 begin
2 sum← 0
3 w ← [∅ for k in range(j − i+ 1)] # Python-like creation of an array of ∅s
4 for k in 0 : j − i: do
5 wins=getWinningSolves(BC(i, j) [k]) # get SolveCT ’s that won their competition
6 for win in wins: do
7 sum← sum+ getPF (win) # Half the promised fee of the competition of win
8 w[k] ← append(w[k],getWinnerID(win))
9 end
10 end
11 Wt = getTotalCardinalWeight(w)
12 blockProfits← [0 for k in range(j − i+ 1)]
13 for k in 0 : j − i: do
14 blockProfits[k] = |w[k]|∗sumWt
15 end
16 Return blockProfits
17 end
The next step of a competition is validation.
Validation entirely depends on the dTMN, whose
members wish to perform work, reach consensus,
and seal competitions to gain more profits as dis-
cussed above. The storage miners here receive
means to go back and validate the solution com-
mitments submitted during the competition. The
validate transaction holds for each dTMN member
an encrypted list of SloveCT transaction ids that
were successfully validated (for example, we can use
hash functions). Upon publication of a validation
transaction the dTMN publishes the last transac-
tion that seals the competition: SealCT . Here, the
dTMN members present the decryption algorithm
for extracting their results in the V alidateCT trans-
action. This defines a consensus solution and the
competition winner(s) as the optimal solution that
appeared first in the ledger wins.
To emphasize the importance of maintaining
pools that reward competition infrastructure we in-
formally present a proposition below (elaborated in
Section 3). Our goal is to illustrate the feasibility
of an equilibrium in which it is the miners’ goal to
complete as many competitions as possible.
Proposition 2.3. (Compete Nash Equilibrium
feasibility) Assume that the mean block reward
per solve transactions is higher than the mean of
regular non-competition transaction fees. The com-
petition rules constitute an equilibrium in which
the best strategy of hash block signers is to gather
as many SolveCT transactions as possible, whereas
computational task solving miners best strategy is
to send their solutions. The optimal strategy of the
storage miner is to answer retrieve requests of com-
putational miners and send them the data. The
optimal strategy of the block assembly miners is to
enable SolveCT transactions to be added.
Proof. Block signing PoW miners know that by in-
cluding more solve transactions that have they in-
crease their expected relative weight in the output
of MainChainWeightAllocation. Thus, when they
assemble blocks the best strategy for increasing the
expected profit is to include the solutions with the
best declared scores. The exact number depends on
three parameters: (1) how many competitions are
alive, (2) the difference between the mean reward of
standard transactions and solve transactions, and
(3) the probability that the submitted commitment
will fail.
Storage miners are paid proportionally to their
work. They would like to have as many compu-
tational miners as possible whose data copies were
11
retrieved from them. On the other hand, the com-
putational miners, which aim to win competitions
by submitting their results, know that the submis-
sion associated fee is a PF. Thus, they only pay it in
case they are selected to be winners and therefore
they have incentive to submit solutions
2.3.3 How to keep the solution safe
A natural question regarding the competition proto-
col above is how can we make sure that upon send-
ing a solution an attacker cannot take it and claim
it as is own? We propose two options to solve this
issue, see Figure 3.
The first solution is based on the idea of cryp-
tographic commitment. This is the digital analog
of taking information, sealing it in an envelope, and
putting that envelope out on the table where every-
one can see it. This means that the solver commits
to the score written on the envelope, but the so-
lution remains a secret from everyone else. Later,
in the sealing phase, the winner can open the en-
velope and reveal the value that he had committed
to earlier. A simple implementation of commitment
can be done by utilizing a hash function: the miner
sends the hash of the solution and a nonce. After
the competition is over the winner can prove his
commitment by sending the real solution together
with the nonce to the blockchain in order to finalize
and seal the competition.
Another solution is based on randomly parti-
tioning the solution into shards. Here, the miner
submits a few shards for each member of the dTMN.
Each shard has a randomly assigned number, taken
at random from a large space that the miner does
not share with anyone. Only when all shard num-
bers are visible can a dTMN member order the
shards and assemble the correct solution. This so-
lution removes the need of the solving miner to stay
alive after a competition, but substantially increases
the dependence in the dTMN.
Example 2.4 (Random shards)Assume that the
miner partitions the textual representation of the
solution into 12 parts S1, S2, , S12. Then, each shard
receives a random number between 1 and 100, 000,
for example:
100, 500, 985, 12354, 50000, 60000, 60001, 69001,
80000, 90000, 90020, 999000
If two shards are randomly selected for each mem-
ber of the dTMN, and assume that there are seven
nodes in the dTMN then each node holds 2/7 of the
solution and with high probability does not even
know if the shards they have are close or not in the
correct ordering. When it is time for validation, the
miners exchange shards. Only if a piece of the solu-
tion is missing the nodes contact the computational
miner.
2.3.4 Block sizes and transactions
Given that a computational competition requires
several transactions, going from the pre setup phase
by the storage chain (discussed next) to the sealing
phase through miner-submitted solutions, we need
to make sure that current block sizes can enable
the new protocol. Figure 4 shows the block sizes
of Bitcoin and Ethereum over time. Bitcoins block
size has been stable at near 1 mb per block rate
of 10 minutes. Ethereums blocks are largely > 20
kb where the average block rate is below 20 seconds.
Figure 5 shows statistics for the number of transac-
tions for the two networks. Given that: (1) Decred
aims to keep its blocks at around 1 mb, and (2) our
transactions will be light thanks to keeping most
information in the storage chain we conclude that
the burden of maintaining competition is within the
capabilities of current block sizes.
2.4 The storage chain
Our storage component can be easily built upon ex-
isting storage blockchains. Roughly, these systems
address the following issues:
1. Closing a deal: create a reliable platform that
enables a clients market and a miners market
2. Payment for storing the data
3. Proof-of-Replication: how miners prove they
hold a valid replica of the data
4. Payment for retrieving the data
5. Data encryption (may be if left to the users)
6. General blockchain maintenance
Our requirements are only a subset of what these
systems address. It is crucial however, that off-
chain micro-payment will be available: when two
parties transfer data we use a protocol that ensures
the transfer but keeps most of the information off
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Figure 3: Two digital mechanisms that can be used for signing solutions. A) Standard digital signatures
require the miner additional activity after the compete phase as only then the dTMN require the solution.
B) Shard based method does not require a second interaction with the solving miner but it puts all trust
on the dTMN.
Figure 4: Block sizes of Bitcoin and Ethereum. Source: https://bitinfocharts.com/
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Figure 5: Number of transactions in Bitcoin and Ethereum. Bitcoin: number of transactions
per block. Source: https://blockchain.info. Ethereum: number of transaction per day. Source:
https://etherscan.io/chart/tx.
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chain (proofs and certifications are kept for track-
ing). As exemplary systems that provide all func-
tions above we consider Filecoin [14] and Storj [15].
For a thorough explanation on each system, see the
Appendix.
2.4.1 Our adapted storage protocol
Clearly, one can use any storage to keep important
task data. In fact, we can even consider using cen-
tralized cloud services such as Amazon or Google
Cloud. However, the entire protocol would become
centralized and tightly dependent on an external
provider, which contradicts our goal to create a vi-
able self-contained system. Technical side-effects of
using external providers include: (1) the network
is now sensitive to the provider’s API modification
and maintenance, (2) using an external coin requires
additional exchanges, and (3) the system has no
control or effect on the storage cost. Another issue is
inefficiency in that: (1) data will be copied twice for
validations, and (2) it will not exploit the fact that
miners that hold the data can easily validate solu-
tions and there is practically no added heavy cost to
the hardware they need to keep. The dTMNs (task-
specific masternode networks) take upon themselves
the maintenance of the task data and the validation
of the solutions once the competition phase is over.
Our default suggestion is to take Filecoin as base
code, change it for our needs and make the storage
’´smarter´’ by supporting validations.
Storage constraints and collaterals
In this section we adopt standard storage-based
notation that uses time span instead of counting
blocks to allow more granularity. Below we define
parameters and their constraints.
• Let Tx be the block number at time T auditing
the transaction x.
• Let timeoutx be the number of blocks for
timeout transaction x.
• bid request becomes invalid after
timeoutpublish blocks starting from Tpublish
• A miner that publishes an ask request in
Task must lock the needed resources for
timeoutpublish + Tbid − Task
• The dTMN of CT promises to store the
dataset for at least timeoutfreeze starting
from Tstored
• After Tsolved storage miners must keep the
data for a timeoutretrive
dTMN problem gathering
The client starts by submitting a bid request
(in-chain) in a transaction called PublishCT . Then,
storage miners submit ask requests. Only after at
least rs miners publish an ask request, the client and
the miners sign joint deal transaction, which we pre-
viously denoted as StoredCT (see Figure 6). Using
a multi-signature process, this group becomes the
dTMN that provides services. All subsequent trans-
actions, including those providing PoSt, are made
as a group via one multi-signature transaction.
In order to minimize the number of in-chain
transactions, storage services are audited using
micro-payment method. Micro-payment channel
is used by storage miners and computational min-
ers, as well as with the client on solution retriev-
ing. Proofs of micropayments (e.g., claim micro-
payment transaction) are done once by the dTMN
after the computational competition process is com-
pleted. The same holds also for PoSt proofs. Having
said that, a single node of the dTMN may also sub-
mit a transaction when the dTMN parties are not
honest. dTMN may become smaller due to parties
failure, therefore the network keeps following the
dTMN size. If the dTMN gets too small (e.g., less
than rs2 + 1) then the network considers this dTMN
as failed and the computation process is stopped.
The dTMN, as an efficient storage network unit
will send and receive data in chunks. In order to
keep high-availability, each node in the dTMN holds
the whole copy of the data. This is achieved by
chunk exchange. Chunk exchange is highly benefi-
cial here because it is much faster than sending the
whole dataset to each miner.
3 Protocol properties
3.1 Forging via 51% attacks
Carrying a 51% attack in our system, by defini-
tion, requires achieving 51% of both the PoS and
the PoW components. This is a useful property
of Decred: hash solving miners propose new blocks,
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Figure 6: A simple illustration of the process that leads to a Stored transaction.
whereas PoS miners approve past blocks. An adver-
sary that reaches only 51% in the hash component
still needs to get the proposed blocks approved. An
adversary that holds 51% of the stakes cannot sug-
gest new blocks. Thus, when there are many miners
of both types, it becomes very difficult and resource
consuming to try such attacks. This is a valuable
property is not violated in our system thanks to the
accumulation of past useful work.
3.2 O(1) attacks
The competition’s freeze phase makes O(1) attacks
that involve low difficulty problems unlikely because
the adversary has no guarantee that he will be able
to win his own offer back. As a result, O(1) at-
tacks with notable outcomes require acquiring many
coins, submitting problems with a very high diffi-
culty, which will also result in locking them for long
time periods. This is, in essence, equivalent to per-
forming PoS because the adversary first needs to ac-
quire coins in order to submit a new task (a client
that has no coins cannot offer feesolve), and then
these coins are locked until the competition rewards
are distributed after > Bdist blocks. On the other
hand, our PoS higher profit invarnace guarantees
that the O(1) adversary is better off with perform-
ing PoS, which does not even require computational
resources.
Under the constraints above we are still able to
set the protocol parameters such that the system
the honest miner that won a competition gets more
than feesolve, submitted by the client. Why is this
even possible? Keep in mind that we have a gap:
using vstakes to purchase tickets is not equivalent
to using money to buy tickets. The former is not en-
titled to the extra rewards that the pure PoS miner
expects. This gap allows earning > 100% compared
to the client-submitted fees, as we shall show next.
Theorem 3.1. For a ticket price y there exists a
set of parameter assignment to r, ppools, pvstake such
that the expected profit of a pure PoS mining is
higher than that of an O(1) adversary.
Proof.
Assume that the adversary submitted a prob-
lem with an offer to pay y. By definition, ppoolsy is
paid to the pools that reward the storage and main
chain infrastructure. He then gets y(1−ppools) back
by solving his own problem and pvstakey(1− ppools)
in virtual stakes. These are minted new coins and
there is no added reward. The total reward of the
adversary is:
y(1− ppool) + pvstake(1− ppools) =
(pvstake + 1)(1− ppools)y
Performing PoS in the same time by buying a
ticket in price y would have resulted in an expected
reward of:
Pr(ticket is selected)ry +
yPr(ticket is not selected) =
0.95ry + 0.05y = y(0.95r + 0.05)
Setting r = 1.1 we get an expected pay back
for PoS of 1.095y. We can now easily set the other
parameters such that:
1 < (pvstake + 1)(1− ppools) < 1.095
For example, pvstake = 0.25, ppools = 0.15 yields
1.0625. Alternatively, if we want to mint less coins
per virtual stake then: pvstake = 0.15, ppools = 0.1
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yields 1.035.
We proved the theorem above by example. How-
ever, note that the analysis above defines an infinite
number ways to select parameters. To see this, as-
sume we wish to keep a given percentage pos dif-
ference between the expected PoS reward and the
reward of a computational miner. Assume we wish
to maximize the computational miners profit. This
amounts to the following constrained problem:
argmaxpvstake,ppools(pvstake + 1)(1− ppools)
s.t.
(1) (0.95r + 0.05)− pos =
(pvstake + 1)(1− ppools)
(2) 0 ≤ pvstake, ppools ≤ 1
Figure 7 below illustrates how for pos = 0.01
we get an infinite set of ways to adjust the param-
eters for different expected PoS rewards.
3.3 Suboptimal solutions
The computational miner can submit many solu-
tions but the system discourages sending out too
many suboptimal solutions, under the assumption
that there are honest miners working on the same
problem. An honest miner that did substantial
work is likely to offer a small transaction fee. This is
crucial if the PoW miners are bombarded with solu-
tions. In this case, the honest computational miner
looks at the ledger and knows that his solution is
better (because solution scores are not encrypted).
He is then likely to offer a transaction fee that is
similar to that of an average non-competition trans-
action fee. In this case the SSA (suboptimal solu-
tions adversary) that tries to overwhelm the system
with solutions will have to pay substantial funds.
This concept is similar to early suggestions for fight-
ing spam emails: the spammer needs to pay a lot
to succeed, whereas the honest users pay negligible
sum per transaction [16]. Moreover, note that the
PoW miner will also accept solutions with better
scores into the block as these increase the chance
to get sums from the pools. Thus, the SSA knows
that submitting random solutions is a strategy that
is likely to end in loss.
3.4 The dTMN and fault tolerance
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) is the dependabil-
ity of the system in failure of components (and the
identification thereof) [17]. We discussed above sev-
eral mechanisms to prevent colluding attempts (e.g.,
make storage miners be more like DASH mastern-
odes). However, for BFT, note that our system
always depends on both reaching a consensus and
getting it approved. For the competition validation
phase we give vote management to the block min-
ers by letting storage miners submit commitment of
their votes. Thus, there is no need for dTMN mem-
bers to coordinate their response and in case some
miss their chance due to failure, there are still others
that can reach consensus. The dTMN members are
expected to send their results separately but con-
sistently until the validate and seal transactions are
published. This is similar for requesting masternode
members or PoS right owners from other protocols
to be present in a given time otherwise they lose
their rights.
3.5 Block withholding attacks
Block withholding, also called selfish mining, is an
attack in which a large mining pool withholds mined
blocks in hope to mine another one and let the net-
work pursue an orphan block. By doing so, the at-
tacker can present its longer chain later and make
the network accept it as the new consensus [18]. The
existence of this vulnerability and proven strategies
that incentivize miners to join such pools, shows
that the Bitcoin protocol in fact may promote de-
centralization by joining to pools, that in turn can
attack the system even with as low as 25% power
(after the improvements suggested by [18]). Several
analyses had deepen the understanding of such at-
tacks, but were mainly confined to Bitcoin itself or
to other very similar protocols [19, 20].
Nevertheless, this attack still requires large com-
puting power, and is currently not suitable for hy-
brid PoS systems, especially ones similar to De-
cred in which the PoS approves blocks. Here, with-
holding a block and letting the network focus on a
shorter chain is in fact not beneficial once the PoS
mechanism approved the shorter chain. In these
cases, the shorter chain is accepted as the consen-
sus because it is the only one whose block before
the current head was approved. Even though our
system aims to deviate PoW power to the compu-
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Figure 7: Computational miner reward parameters under the PoS constraints. For different PoS expected
reward factors and a desired margin of pos = 0.01 each line shows the set of pvstake and ppools combination
that satisfies the constraint in which PoS is more profitable than O(1) attack.
tational tasks and thus reduce the hash difficulty, it
does not come at the expense of this property.
3.6 Can miners collude?
Given that the computational task miners all com-
pete for rewards from the client, there is a certain
risk of colluding. For example, miners may agree to
send out random solutions without doing any work.
Note however that we only need a single honest
miner per computational task to render the entire
colluding effort barren. This property weakens the
conspiring adversaries substantially as they do not
necessarily know that all miners had agreed, which
is very difficult if the network is large. Moreover,
even under such agreement the entire system is still
under the prisoner’s dilemma: even rational collud-
ing miners are not likely to cooperate especially if
they know that all they need to do is a relatively
small amount of useful work to win the competition
and claim the rewards. Thus, betraying the part-
ners results in a greater reward. As all miners are
aware of this, the rationale behavior will be to start
competing, especially once a non-random solution
score is visible on the blockchain.
Finally, we can consider active mechanisms that
can be added to prevent such attacks (if required
in practice). First, in a similar fashion to the way
public machine learning competitions are held, the
organizing institution typically performs a simple
initial analysis of the task and submits the result to
the network. Selecting tasks at random and submit-
ting the solution at a random time point dismantles
the attack and provides a reasonable solution to the
costumer. Second, having a public reputation board
will be useful in any case. However, this is a more
involved solution that will require a thorough ex-
amination of the incentives.
4 The agents and the market
The goal of this section is to review the protocol
from the viewpoints of the agents of the system and
describe how the market will play a role in adjusting
the incentives and the competitions. This discus-
sion is important because useful work systems, ex-
cept those designed solely for contributing hardware
to specific goals (e.g., SETI@home) [21], depend on
the clients.
4.1 Computational miner’s view
4.1.1 Choosing a problem for solving
A computational miner can choose any stored com-
putational task that has a matching storedCT trans-
action (but not validateCT nor timeoutretrive ex-
pired). Retrieving a problem credits the storage
miner in a way that is proportional to the associ-
ated fee. This fee can be later used as a part of
the storage pool from which storage miners receive
additional rewards as explained above. Technically,
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this is promised by using micro-payment protocol
between the storage miner and the computational
miner whose final output is shown in a deal trans-
action in the main ledger.
4.1.2 Publishing solutions
Publishing a solution is allowed only after the freeze
phase. Using the freeze phase serves two goals: (1)
it gives time for the miners to evaluate whether or
not they have the required resources to join the com-
petition and (2) it prevents O(1) attacks that over-
whelm the system with easy tasks. The solution
is stored by the dTMN and a signature of the so-
lution is published in-chain by SolveCT . It is im-
portant to note here that even though the storage
has indirect incentive to reach to validation phase,
the storage miners are directly incentivized because
sending out data credits them when pool sums are
distributed. In Section 2.3 we suggested two ways
of storing a solution such that the miners work is not
compromised: (1) Signed commitments, (2) Shuf-
fled Shards.
4.1.3 Getting more than solving fees
A natural point against useful work within a de-
centralized blockchain may be the following. If the
client pays a and the system adds b then the to-
tal cost of a task for the system is a + b, whereas
the miner is entitled only for c < a. Such analysis
may be suitable for past useful work suggestions. In
our system this point is avoided thanks to two main
considerations. First, as we showed above the com-
putational miner receives c > a without opening the
system to O(1) attacks.
Second, we must consider the balance between
the computational tasks market and the blockchain
market (including a minting process, if used) to cor-
rectly analyze the effective cost of the task. Gen-
erally, the client first pays directly to miners that
solve tasks and for the blockchain infrastructure.
Note that these fees are indirectly under the mar-
kets regulation (e.g., by comparing to cloud service
costs): these prices must be appealing for the min-
ers as compared to solving hash puzzles. Making
miners solve tasks diverges the system towards solv-
ing useful work instead of hash puzzles. Thus, the
same energy that was otherwise used by the system
to solve harder hash puzzles is used for tasks and
there are no expenses incurred.
So, where does this extra wealth is coming from?
The answer is the blockchain itself, if its own mar-
ket has a value. That is, the set of products that
can serve financial systems and enable trading.
How does PoAW serve the blockchain? Our an-
swer here is simple: it is accumulated and used for
the PoS system, which in our case is also useful
for improving governance and avoiding N@S issues.
Thus, as implied in Section 3.1 above, these ac-
cumulated stakes are used to strengthen the system
such that if only a small group of miners chooses to
solve hash puzzles, they cannot carry 51% attacks.
4.2 Storage miners
4.2.1 Storage verifies the solution
After freeze the phase is over, the solution can be
revealed. At this point each node of the dTMN ver-
ifies all submitted solutions. Then, miners start the
voting process in order to reach consensus. The
dTMN publishes a multi-signed validate transac-
tion V alidatedCT containing all voting results, en-
crypted. One can think on the following voting
strategy: vote as the current majority. That way,
he doesnt have to validate the results. Therefore,
each vote is encrypted, and only after publishing
the encrypted voting results, the keys are added to
the SealCT transaction. We have therefore reached
a dual result. First, now dTMN members have no
incentive to cast erroneous or random votes. Sec-
ond, the protocol can declare a winner that is the
first validated best solution.
4.2.2 Network payments and incentives
Payment to the storage will be done only after the
solution was kept for some time factor (letting the
client pull the solution). Only storage miners that
validate the answer correctly (vote as the majority)
on all the solutions will be paid. Per storage ser-
vice, the storage miners are paid from the storage
infrastructure pool. Their fees are extracted auto-
matically only for services that were proved. As
a result, each storage miner of the dTMN will be
payed per given service. The payment is propor-
tional to the amount of his work. For example, if
a storage miner uploaded X kb and the total up-
loaded kb of the storage in the analyzed time win-
dow is Y , then he will be paid by X/Y . Note that
for receiving and storing the data from the client
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the dTMN members are paid directly not from the
pool. Finally, note that there is no need to further
pay for validation as without depositing the vali-
dation results, the competition cannot end and the
payments to the pools will not occur. Our method
encourages storage miners to do as much work as
possible per computational task as a part of their
optimal strategy (see Proposition 2.3).
4.3 The clients and the market
4.3.1 Network maintenance costs
Upon submitting a computational task, the user
specifies a set of fees and promised fees:
• feetr: same as any other transaction (pay-
ment to the main chain for taking the trans-
action)
• feesub: a bid in the Storage Market, used for
paying for storage
• Retrieval: retrieving data in the Retrieval
Market, used for paying the storage for send-
ing data
• Validation: used for validation payment
• Maintaining: used for paying the main chain
for holding all other transactions
• feesolve: the payment to the winning solver
Note that the promised fees above can be predefined
percentages of feesolve. Moreover, the protocol can
define a set of constraints, e.g., that the total sum
of payments to the main chain pool is at least 15%.
Optimal assignment of these parameters is still un-
der research.
4.3.2 Client retrieves the solution
After voting for the best solution, the client can re-
trieve the data from storage (off-chain) using micro-
payment protocol. The dTMN will be paid only
after timeoutretrive for letting the client time to re-
trieve.
4.3.3 Useful work difficulty
Previous useful work suggestions aimed for replac-
ing hash puzzles with a completely new mechanism.
This created a problem with the need to correctly
estimate the difficulty of each instance from each
considered problem. For most problems, this task
is currently not feasible as complexity analysis usu-
ally involves obtaining bounds for the worst-case or
average-case running time. Our approach is rad-
ically different: we let the client decide how much
each task is worth. This means that the clients have
to evaluate the cost by comparing to other alter-
natives in the market and then suggest what they
consider a fair proposal. Of course, this will need to
be balanced between the goal of saving costs (com-
pared to other alternatives) and attracting miners.
4.3.4 Storage cost balance
The market determines the balance solving fees and
storage fees, which are proposed separately (do not
confuse the initial storage fee from the downstream
funds that go for maintaining the storage pool).
This balance cannot be evaluated in advance the-
oretically as this is subject to fluctuating costs of
hardware and energy consumption. We therefore,
as in the previous section, let the market reach the
optimal balance, which is also expected to be up-
dated dynamically.
5 Computational competitions
In this section we discuss the merit of competitions
and the fields that may benefit from them. Note
that in this paper we discuss as an example having
a competition for a hard optimization problem. In
general, our methods can be adapted to additional
competitions that are of better fit to certain fields
such as machine learning (work in progress). For
simplicity, we keep the discussion about optimiza-
tion problems only.
5.1 The system’s efficiency
Our protocol, like any decentralized blockchain pro-
tocol, is bound to have redundancy. First, the
blockchain itself has many copies. Second, each
member of the dTMN has a copy of the data of
a task. Finally, the computational miners compete
for gains from the same problems. The first two re-
dundancies result from the need to reach consensus
between agents in the system, which is crucial for
decentralization. We therefore accept these two as
needed constraints. The third redundancy,however,
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is a much more delicate issue and it is the main
focus of this section.
From the computation perspective, our sug-
gested competition-based system substantially dif-
fers from the classic view of utilizing distributed sys-
tems for computational tasks, which are predom-
inantly centralized systems. Moreover, many dis-
tributed computing protocols where designed for
managing large clusters of many limited power
nodes. In contrary, in our network each miner may
be a powerful agent with substantial computing re-
sources. This can be seen as having a network of
clusters such that each cluster has a known man-
ager [22].
5.1.1 The irrelevant WC
To make our discussion more formal we compare
our system to an optimal centralized system with no
reliability or connection issues. Let nm be the num-
ber of miners in the system and nt be the number of
tasks. We make the following simplifying assump-
tions: (1) nm and nt are the same in both systems
(2) all miners have the same computing power, (3)
all miners have the same same energy consumption
per computing unit per time, (4) in our system min-
ers select tasks at random, uniformly over all tasks,
(5) all tasks require the same resources exactly, they
take one hour to run in a single machine (to make
time discrete and standardized), and (6) all tasks
are all worth the same value v. Let e be the ra-
tio between the income per hour in the centralized
system and the expected income in our system.
Clearly, the worst-case scenario for our system
is when there are only a few tasks and many miners
solve the same problems using the same determinis-
tic algorithm. In this case, the expected number of
solved tasks in our system is ntnm . Assume nt < nm,
then:
e =
vnt
vnt/nm
= nm
which means that the system is inefficient in a way
that is linear in the number of miners.
The analysis above is irrelevant for us as our goal
is not to use our blockchain system to provide a gen-
eral purpose work stations for users, nor do we seek
to replace current centralized cloud systems. Alter-
natively, we seek to solve computing and modeling
bottlenecks that are widely common in large opti-
mization problems. These problems are typically
solved using algorithms that either have stochastic
component to them or there is a large set of hyper-
parameters that guide the search and there is only
partial prior knowledge on how to set them. Exam-
ples for sources for internal randomness include: se-
lection of an initial guess (e.g., SGD), random vari-
able ordering (e.g., within a branch-and-cut algo-
rithm), Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sim-
ulations, and simulation within genetic algorithms.
Moreover, in many situations such algorithms can
be distributed into small tasks. This type of prob-
lems are the basis for machine learning and pattern
recognition and we shall discuss specific examples
below.
5.1.2 Closing the gap
The efficiency gap illustrated above quickly vanishes
when the user’s perspective is taken into consider-
ation. Most importantly, for almost all optimiza-
tion problems for AI one of the following is true.
First, users need to rerun their tasks several times
in order to examine how the internal randomness
of the algorithm affects the solution. For example,
in SGD, we may accidentally choose a bad combi-
nation of an initial solution and optimization pa-
rameters that will lead to a useless result. Second,
the problem can be distributed into many small
tasks that can run in parallel (this step may run
sequentially, but each iteration involves paralleliza-
tion). For example, in integer programming there
are many algorithms that break the input problem
into many subproblems (e.g., by taking a subspace
of the variables).
The two points above directly affect e in a way
that creates a trade-off. First, distributing a large
task into many small ones means that both the dif-
ficulty of each task can be decreased and nt can be
much larger than nm. In these cases, the overall
income of the system depends on how many tasks
can a miner take on. In any case, distribution can
bound the number of miners per competition.
Second, the true cost for users is a function of
the total number of times they need to run the algo-
rithm in practice. Moreover, even with different at-
tempts there is no guarantee that the solution con-
verged to the best one (or even a useful one) and no
guarantee that the search space was thoroughly ex-
amined. In contrast, using our competition-based
paradigm there is a single run of the competition
and the powerful miners compete by testing differ-
ent options. Thus, the costumer can propose a much
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lower cost as compared to the effective cost (e.g.,
five times the price per task, assuming users will
execute 20 runs in a centralized system) and min-
ers will still see it as a very high profit opportunity.
Moreover, the competition can even achieve a bet-
ter final result compared to the centralized system
in which the user have limited resources that reduce
the number of attempts.
5.2 Machine learning competitions
The lack of one master algorithm for all machine
learning or optimization problems is a known result,
also known as the no free lunch theorem [23, 24].
Empirical difficulties over time had led the com-
munity to establish competitions and challenges in
order to achieve progress. These had proven to be
extremely valuable for advancing machine learning.
One of the most famous examples for this concept is
Kaggle, which is a platform in which data scientists
can compete for challenges posted by organizations
(e.g., [25]). Another, more academic example is the
DREAM challenges in computational biology define
competitions for specific applications. Then, by in-
vestigating and integrating the submitted solutions
progress can be made, for example, by adjusting
algorithms and their parameters [26].
There are many examples for successful compe-
titions in Machine learning and we cannot go over
them all here. These competitions are especially
useful for advancing applications that had proved
difficult over time. We focus here on two examples
that historically led to substantial progress. First,
the Netflix challenge that led to a marked progress
in Collaborative Filtering as tool for creating rec-
ommendation systems [27].
Second, and more famous these days, is Deepl
Learning. This is a renaissance of the neural net-
work machine learning branch that started roughly
in 2012 thanks to the ImageNet competition [28,
29]. In this challenge, competitors were asked to
learn image classifiers for > 5000 possible labels
using > 3 million images. A multi-layered ’´deep´’
neural network achieved top performance by a sub-
stantial margin.
Over the last years this field produced machine
learning models that markedly outperform previ-
ous alternatives. The field has attracted an in-
flux of interest from both academy and commercial
companies. Unlike other statistical learning fields,
the most important achievements are based on a
purely empirical heuristic research. These methods
are used in many fields today ranging from image
processing and speech recognition to applications
in quantum physics. The nature of the field also
precludes using a limited number of models for all
applications. This is exacerbated due to the reliance
on numerical experimentation to select the best ar-
chitecture for an application.
Our protocol can be used to establish a compe-
tition for each application in the blockchain as long
as the underlying problem can be formulated as an
optimization problem. Based on the empirical ob-
servation that competitions are a useful way to en-
hance machine learning, our system is expected to
improve upon state of the art in many tasks.
5.3 Practical applications
As a proof of concept we are developing pipelines for
computational tasks to solve two important practi-
cal problems: deep learning and mixed integer lin-
ear programming. Simpler versions of these prob-
lems were presented in Examples 2.3. and 2.3.
Our goal is not to provide a thorough review of these
fields, nor do we aim to present novel methodology.
In this section we present basic algorithms and illus-
trate how they can be used to solve problems using
our system. Note however, that unlike our proof
of concept below, our system is much more general
as it does not impose on miners which algorithm to
run.
5.3.1 Deep Learning
Training neural networks for a specific application
requires several steps. First, we need to define the
network architecture. This includes the number of
layers and their types, which determine the inter-
nally extracted features. Second, hyper-parameters
are set. For example, the dropout level in each layer,
the batch sizes etc. Dropout is a technique that in-
volves random removal of arrows from the network
during the internal learning steps. It can also be
set in the first step by specifying a dropout layer.
Finally, we define a loss function such as l2 loss for
regression or cross-entropy for classification and fit
the network parameters by optimizing it using SGD
techniques [30, 31]. The backpropagation algorithm
is an elegant way to exploit the layered structure
of the network to compute gradients efficiently. It
works by transforming the learning process on all
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layers into SGD runs. There are other techniques
in deep learning such as asynchronous SGD (Async-
SGD) that can be distributed and better exploit
systems with more resources [32].
As a proof of concept we illustrate why deep
learning tasks fit our framework we review recent
advances in AsyncSGD [33, 34]. These algorithms
work by having two types of machines in the sys-
tem: some are workers tasked with optimization
and some are listeners of the workers that are tasked
with updating the solutions and sending updated
parameters and intermediate solutions to the work-
ers. The goal of developing fast asynchronous op-
timization techniques for machine learning is clear:
practitioners will be able to train better models and
do it either faster or with different distributed sys-
tems. However, these algorithm aggravate the un-
certainty aspect of the process, mainly because of
staleness: when performing distributed AsyncSGD
we may have a worker that optimizes a set of pa-
rameters that are too old (i.e., were already updated
substantially by some other worker). For example,
we do not know in advance what is the best parti-
tion of our machines into workers vs. listeners.
Specifically [33] tested different variants of
AsyncSGD including a semi synchronous alterna-
tive called Sync-OPT. The authors illustrated sev-
eral properties, on different datasets including Im-
ageNet and MNIST, that are relevant to us on dif-
ferent datasets. First, the experiments nicely show
that by using AsyncSGD an almost linear improve-
ment in running time can be achieved as a function
of the number of used GPUs. However, using too
many worker GPUs per task (¿90 as a rule of thumb,
can result in ¿5 hours slow down) may be too dis-
ruptive and the algorithm may become inefficient.
Second, tens and even a hundred GPUs can be ex-
ploited to solve problems. Third, different variants
even when using the same computational resources
may differ substantially in precision (even up to 4-
6%).
5.3.2 Mixed Integer Linear Programming
This is general framework that can be used for many
pattern recognition problems, see [35] for exam-
ple. Rough estimate of the importance of this field
quickly covers thousands of commercial companies
from more than forty different fields that use the
framework [36]. An MILP program is a problem
with: (1) a linear objective function fTx, where
f is a column vector of constants and x are vari-
ables, (2) bounds and linear constraints, non-linear
constraints are not allowed, and (3) restrictions on
some of the variables to be integers [37]. A standard
representation of the problem is typically written:
minimize
x
fTx
subject to Ax ≤ b
Aeqx = beq
lb ≤ x ≤ ub
∀j ∈ S, S ⊆ {1, , |x|} xj ∈ Z
Even though MILP is NP-Complete (easily via
a reduction from clique) many solvers have been
presented previously that work well in many prac-
tical cases even when the number of variables and
constraints reach tens of thousands. There are both
commercial and open source available solvers. Most
notable commercial tools are CPLEX (IBM) [38],
Gurobi [39], and LINDO [40]. Even Microsoft Ex-
cel and MATLAB support MILP solving. Notable
open source tools are CLP (from COIN-OR [41])
and glpk. There are more than a dozen other avail-
able tools. Some of these tools use a branch-and-
cut algorithm to guide the search space. These al-
gorithms are highly dependent on the order of the
variables, which can be used as a randomness source
for the competition.
5.4 Data size example: small to medium
size problem
Assume we deal with a small to medium size prob-
lem that is at most 100MB of data and the solution
size is 1% of the problem size which is less than
1MB. For example, finding the maximal clique: the
input may be a matrix of n2 for dense graphs, while
the output in n. Therefore, for any n > 100 the out-
put is less than 1%. Assuming average upload rate
of a user is 8Mb→ 1MB. In this case the client up-
loads the problem in a couple of minutes. Assuming
average download rate of 24Mb → 3MB. There-
fore, the miner downloads the problem in roughly
half a minute. As long as solving the problem takes
more than half a minute, the miner can be kept
busy (http://www.speedtest.net/reports/united-
states/). Solving the maximum clique problem
exhaustively will take 2n. A farm with 100 GPUs
can do 800T flops.
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A Appendix A: Abbreviations
• dTMN: Dynamic Task masternode network
• CT: Computational task
• GD: Gradient Descent
• MILP: Mixed Integer Linear Programming
• PoAW: Proof-of-Accumulated-Work
• PoD: Proof-of-Deposit
• PoW: Proof-of-Work
• PoS: Proof-of-Stake
• PoSe: Proof-of-Service
• PoSt: Proof-of-Spacetime
• PoRep: Proof-of-Replication
• PF: Promised fee
• SGD: Stochastic Gradient Descent
• SSA: Suboptimal solution adversary
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B Appendix B: Parameters
• rs: minimal number of replicates in a TMN
• r > 1: the expected profit factor of a PoS
miner
• feesolve: the total amount that the client is
willing to pay for a task CT
• feetr: a standard transaction fee that is sug-
gested in order to add the transaction into the
network
• pvstake: the percentage of earned useful work
amount that is created as virtual stakes
• ppool1, ppool2
• ppools = ppool1 + ppool2
• Bdist: the time window for running pool dis-
tribution fee algorithms
C Minimum distance in graphs
Let G =< V,E > be an undirected graph with non-
negative edge weights, and a pair of nodes u, v ∈ V .
The distance between u and v is the minimal num-
ber of steps required to traverse the graph such that
we start from v and reach u. This task does not
satisfy resistance, hiding, and puzzle friendliness.
In addition, validating the distance is not exponen-
tially easier than solving the problem.
Proof.
1. It is straightforward to find input pairs with
the same output: we can easily change G =<
V,E > into a new input G′ =< V ∪ {x}, E >
and the output for u,v is the same. We simply
added a new node x that has no edges going
in or out. These two instances have the exact
same solution.
2. This function is not hiding: knowing the min-
imal distance between u and v, by defini-
tion, gives us information about the under-
lying graph structure.
3. Puzzle friendliness is also violated because:
(1) finding the minimal distance between u
and v is solvable in O(|E| + |V |log|V |), and
(2) there are input instances for which there
are better algorithms than the worst-case: if
the underlying graph is a tree, then there is an
algorithm that solves the problem in O(|V |).
4. Cheap validation: validation can be as hard
as solving the original problem because it re-
quires (in the worst-case) resolving the prob-
lem. In contrast, for hash functions, valida-
tion is exponentially cheaper than solving the
puzzle.
D Storage blockchains
D.0.1 Filecoin
Filecoin manages two markets. First, the Stor-
age Market allows clients to pay the storage min-
ers for storing data. This market audits in-chain:
the management process is done using transactions
that are recorded in the blockchain. Second, the Re-
trieval Market allows clients to retrieve data by pay-
ing data retrieval miners for delivering data. This
market audits off-chain: there is a private process
taken between the client and the provider and the
internal steps are not published in the blockchain.
In both markets, clients submit bid orders to the
market to request a service. In response, the min-
ers submit ask orders to offer a service, when both
parties agree on a price, they jointly create a deal or-
der. In both cases the output deal is signed digitally
and is published as a transaction in the blockchain.
The off-chain component of data retrieval is that the
client-miner negotiation is done privately by them.
A filecoin block is divided into three parts:
I. Orderbook: a data structure that holds in-
chain bid, ask, and deal transactions of the
Storage Market.
II. Transactions: records that hold payment
transactions and client transaction. Filecoins
transactions act as collateral - clients deposit
the funds specified in the order, guaranteeing
commitment and availability of funds during
settlement.
III. Allocation table: holds pointers to the stored
data. The miners storage is partitioned into
sectors, where each sector contains data pieces
assigned to the miner. The Network keeps
track of each sector assignments to miners via
this allocation table. When a storage miner
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sector is filled, the sector is sealed. Sealing is a
slow, sequential operation that transforms the
data in a sector into a replica, a unique physi-
cal copy of the data that is associated with the
public key of the storage miner.
Trustless storage systems have to prove that
it stores the data. This is achieved in File-
coin using a method called Proof-of-Storage. The
miner publishes a proof on chain using a challenge-
response protocol every t time. Filecoin introduced
new methods that implement this protocol such
that a miner can prove the data exists in stor-
age. Their challenge-response mechanism is called
PoRep (proof of replica) and PoSt (proof of space-
time) and it is different from other blockchains like
Storj. PoSt schemes allow a user to check if a stor-
age provider is storing the outsourced data for a
certain time range (and not only at the time of the
challenge).
In order to retrieve the data efficiently, the stor-
age system cannot wait for auditing each opera-
tion in-chain. Therefor filecoin uses an incremental
micropayment scheme. In this scheme, two party
setup a multi signature channel, funds are placed
into this channel. This channel is represented as an
entry on the public ledger. In order to spend funds
from the channel, both parties must agree on the
new balance. The current balance is stored as the
most recent transaction signed by both parties. Bit-
coin lightning network is an example for a system
that uses such schemes [42].
Data encryption: The encryption is made only
by the client. There is no additional mechanism.
Blockchain maintenance: Filecoin is based on a
Proof-of-Stake consensus protocol where the stakes
are based on the storage assigned to each miner
(see section 6.2.3 in the paper). This is an elegant
PoS solution with is similar in spirit to our vstake
mechanism. However, Filecoin does not address the
N@S problem, nor is it designed to handle compu-
tational work.
Flow in the Storage Market:
• To store the data, clients first publish a bid
transaction on the blockchain. Miners can
then see it and in response publish their ask
transaction. If the negotiation is successful,
the client and the miner both sign a deal and
publish it on the blockchain.
• A pointer to the data is written in the alloca-
tion table.
• The miner is paid for storing the data over
time. Every t time it publishes a PoSt and
gets paid a fraction per proof.
Flow in the Retrieval Market:
• Retrieving the data is done off-chain through
a negotiation between the client and the min-
ers holding the data (exchange ask, bid, deal
p2p without auditing it on-chain). When the
deal is done and signed by both parties, the
client receives the data.
• The payment is done using a micropayment
mechanism, which is similar to a lightning
network, and a payout signature is published
when retrieval is done (for payment extrac-
tion). Thus, the public ledger contains infor-
mation that the deal was completed.
D.0.2 Storj
Storj is an application running on the Ethereum
blockchain. Storj uses an ERC-20 token called
STORJ for making payments. Storj uses a trusted
server called bridge. The bridge is used for dele-
gating trust to dedicated server that manages data
ownership and payments.
The Storj market is based on a contract negotia-
tion between the storage provider and the client. If
they both agree on a price then data can be stored.
The client splits the file into shards (encrypted parts
of the file). The negotiation is mediated by the
bridge. The bridge can sniff the network and find
storage providers. Note that Storj heavily relies on
bridges throughout the pipeline and it is therefore
not fully decentralized.
After the negotiation, the client sends the shards
to the miners. Payment is done by micropayment
mechanism (like in lightning networks). The bridge
verifies that the miner holds the shard periodi-
cally by Proof-of-Replication mechanism (challenge-
response) and pays the storage provider on every
proof.
Retrieving the data is performed by negotiation
of the bridge and the miners holding the data. Pay-
ment is also carried by a micropayment mechanism.
Data encryption: Encryption is made by the
user. The bridge also takes a park in maintain-
ing the privacy of the data by dividing the file into
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shards. Only the client and the bridge know where
these data are. As a result, gathering all the data
for going back to the information in the input files
cannot be done by a malicious adversary.
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